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Price Dispersion and Accessibility: A Case
Study of Fast Food
Hayden Stewart* and David E. Davist
This study examines spatial variation in the price and accessibility (if fast food across a major urban area.
We use novel data on the price ol a rcpresentalivc last-fcMxl mciti and Ihc location of fasi-ftxKi restaurants
belonging lo one of three major chains in ihe Disiriet of Columbia and if.s surrounding suburbs. These
dala are used lo lest a structural model of spiifial (.-ompcliliiin. The results of this study are easily
itilerpreted and compared with a pasf ;inalysis. We lind dial spuiial differences in costs and demand
conditions drive variation in ihc nutnber of firms operating in a market, which in tum affects prices.
JKL Clas.siticalion: L l l . LKI. 1)43
1. Introduction
Who pays more lor food? This question ha.s been a subject of debate among researchers. Most
focus on prices at supermarkets and other grocers and ask whether retail food prices tend to be higher
in maricets with a greater proportion of lower income consumers, minority consumers, or consumers
with some other trait. Recent studies include Kauffnan et al. (1997). Hayes (2000). Frankcl and Gould
(2(K)I). as well as MacDonald and Nelson (l'>y!). A few other studies have examined prices al
restaurants, such as Lafontaine (1995), Graddy (1997). Jekanowski (1998), and Thomadsen (2003).
Being able to explain variation in average retail fmxi prices could be useful for government
agencies engaged in price measurement. However, it has also been a goal of researchers who are
concerned with social equity. According to Graddy (1997), there is a perception that retailers engage
in unfair commercial practices in lower income, minority neighborhoods. She poinis out that retail
establishments have been targeted during some riols in urban centers.
Empirical evidence does conlinn some systematic dispersion of prices. According to Kaufman
et al. (1997), who conducted a review of 14 prior studies, grocery prices tend to be higher in urban
centers than in suburban markets. Some speculate that greater access to supcmiarkcts in the suburbs is
responsible. As compared with central-city stores, supermarkets are argued lo offer ihe lowest prices
and the greatest range of brands, package sizes, and quality choices. MacDonald and Nelson (1991)
find that a fixed market basket of goods costs about 4% less in suburban locations ihan in central-city
stores. However, they concede Ihat their analysis is not based firmly in economic theory; rather it is
only exploratory, due to the lack of a preci.se model.
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Studies have been less successful at explaining how and why prices might vary with the
demographic characteristics of a market. First, recent studies of grocery prices have reached mixed
results. For example. Hayes (2()(K)) docs not identify a statistically signilicam relationship between
grocery prices and the income level of a market's residents. By contrast. Frankel and Gould (2001)
find that prices are highest in market.^ with more income inequality. In other words, prices are found to
be highest where there arc more lower income or more higher income households. The lowest prices
are found in markets with more consumers in between these two groups. Second, even when they are
significant, there is the problem of interpreting e.stimation results. For example, the model of Frankel
and Gould (2(X)1) does noi allow those authors to detennine whether their findings are due to
differences in consumer behavior, costs, or difference.s in the characteristics of stores and ihe quality
of the services they provide.
Similar results have been obtained by researchers studying restaurant prices. For example,
Graddy (1997) find.s that prices are higher in neighborhoods with a higher prt)portion of black and
lower income consumers. However, her model does not identify whether the observed dispersion of
prices stems from differences in co.sts and demand conditions or whether it reflects discriminatory
pricing strategies among retailers.
Utilizing a novel set of data on the price of a fast-food meal and the location of fast-food
restaurants in a major urban area, this study te.sts the structural mt>del of spatial competition developed
by Salop (1979). Estimation results based on this model can be easily interpreted. According to this
model, cost and demand conditions first detennine how many stores choose to locate in a market.
Holding all other factors constant, the more fimis in a market, the greater access consumers will have
lo establishments on average. Greater access is defined to mean that consumers will have lower
transportation costs and better substitutes for the .services of any particular store. Stores will likewi.se
have less market power and price more competitively.
This study focuses on fast-foi>d prices because the authors believe such an analysis may be more
easily undertaken than studies of grocery prices. Arguably, iwo different outlets affiliated with the
same fasi-food chain supply relatively homogeneous goods and services. This fact may alleviate the
possibility that differences in store fonnats are confounding the results of studies on grtK'cry prices.
such as central cily stores being smaller or offering a nanower range of goods and services than
suburban supennarkets.'
The results of this study show that cost and demand factors influence prices through their effect
on access. For example, consider a community where an increase occurs in demand, such as through
an increa.se in the population or in the income of existing residents. Holding all eise constant, this
study linds that limis would likely respond by opening more outlets in the community. Consumers
would then have more and better substitutes for the services of any particular store. In tum. restaurants
would have more competitors, less market power, and charge slightly lower prices. In this way, low
population levels and low levels of income might be associated with not only more limited access, but
also higher prices. Moreover, we show that the reduced form of our model closely resembles the type
of model estimated in past studies, including Gruddy (1997). against which we compare our results.
' For example, in examining grocery prices, MacDonald and NeKon i I99h tind ii necessary to control for the type of retail
format at wbicb grtK-eries arc purcbased. Vjiriables include wtielher tbe reiail store is a .supermarket or a warebouse club, tbe
size of a siorc in square feet, and the SLOpc of services offered by a siore. such as wbether there is a delicatessen and a meat
or scafixHl counter. By contrast, the autbors feel that these types of variation do not confound analyses of fast food prices.
Two McDonald's restaurants in separate locations have a relatively nimilar format and offer a relatively similar range of
goods and services.
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2. Theoretical Framework
In models of spatial monopolistic competition, consumers are dispersed over a market area that is
represented with a line, circle, or olher geometric form. Hotelling (1929) proposes a linear market,
while Salop (1979) extends Hotelling s model and develops a circular market with an outside,
homogeneous good. In that model, the homogeneous good is supplied by a competitive industry. In
addition, there are also spatially disix^rsed firms, which share a common fixed cost, incur a constant
marginal cost of production, antl sell a second product. The supply of this second good is
monopolistically competitive. A nurnber of researchers have further expanded on models of spatial
competition, including work by Capozza and Van Order (1978. 1980), MacLeod. Norman, and Thisse
(1988). Rath and Zhao (2001). and Puu (2002).
In Salop's (1979) model, a consumer's costs for purchasing the second good include the retail
price (i.e.. the mill price) and his or her costs for transportation to a retail store." It is a.ssumed that only
if the total cost of obtaining the second item is below the consumer's reservation cost will the
consumer purchase a given number of tinits of this good.' The consumer will buy only the
homogeneous good otherwise. Significant transportation costs can therefore prevent suppliers of the
second good from concentrating all of their production in one location. Customers may incur
a prohibitively large cost for travel to this concentrated site.
Competition among suppliers of the .second good is imperfect in the model of Salop (1979).
Because they incur i\ nonzero cosi of transportation, consumers prefer to patronize the nearest firm if
mill prices are equal. The demand for goods from firm / is then a function of the price of / and the
price of all other finns that are sufficiently close to /. Using this model, Salop (1979) derives the
demand schedule facing a representative firm and shows that prices for the second good are a function
of transportation costs due to their impact on a firm's market power.
Prices for the second goml may decrease with the number of firms in a market under some
assumptions about firm behavior. Salop (1979) shows that, as the number of firms in a market increases,
each firm will be spatially closer to one of its rivals. Consumers may have more and better substitutes for
the goods offered by any single firm. In general, the price charged by firm ( will move closer to I's
marginal cost. A necessary assumption about Hnn behavior is that each finn chooses a best price, given
the perception that all other firms hold their prices constant.** Empirical evidence that prices tend to
decrease with the ntimber of finns in a market has been pnwidcd by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991).
The number ol linns in a market is detemiined in advance of prices. In the model of Salop
(1979). just enough firms enter a market so that, once prices are later determined, economic profits
will be zero.*^ The resulting equilibrium is termed a symmetric zero-profit Nash equilibrium. For
It is assumed ibai all pairons of the same store pay ibc same mill price. For a discussion of how a limi mighl price discriminate
among its consumers, see MacLeod. Nnnnan. and Thisse [ 19Xli). They derive the subgame perfect equilibrium in a two-stage
game in which firms adjusl their mil! prices according to a consumer's costs for iransponation. It is shown that firms may
charge higher prices to their nearest consumer.*., for wbom farther away stores are a relatively poor substitute. Sucb consumers
face a relatively high cost differentia) lor traveling lo ibeir nearest store and ibe next nearest one. By conirasi. tbis cost
differential is relaiively small for consumers wbo aa" located a relatively tar distance from any store.
Salop claims that bis model can he njadily extended to consider clastic demand. For example, see Puu (2(N)2) as well as Rath
and Zhao |2IK)1). who demonstnite ibe i-qtiilibna in mudels of a linear marker
'' Capoz/a and Van Order i I97S| presem a general case allowing for a wider range of assumplion.s aboui linn behavior.
' Firms in the model of .Salop 11979t are ponable. As further argued in Cnpoir/a and Van Order II9S0). portability requires tbat
firms can relocate when new firms enter a market. However, if existing firms are immobile, then tbis equilibrium condition
musi he restated such that lirms will enter a market if and only if they can expect to m ^ e positive economic profits. In other
words, entp.' is sequentially rational.
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instance, given a distribution of firms that are poised to make zero economic profits, a decrease in
fixed costs or an increase in demand would allow for positive economic profits. New fimis will then
enter the market, and. in tum. each firm's market share will decrease. Expected profits then fall with
market shares. This process will continue until all finns can once again expect to earn only a zero
economic profit.
In this study, we use the model of Salop (1979) to motivate a system of structural equations that
serve as the basis for an empirical analysis. We assume that there are M circular markets and consumers
in each market are spatially dispersed, We denote the aggregate demand of consumers in each of these
markets. /;/ = 1. . . . . M. as /),„. We allow D^, to var>' with the number of consumers in each market.
Moreover, we allow the demand for fast food to depend on the stxial and demographic characteristics
of the consumers. However, for prices below the consumer's reservation cost, quantity demanded does
not vary wiih price: rather, consumer demand is inelastic. Consumers pay the retail price and incur
a nonzero cost for traveling to restaurants. In market m. let the number of re.staurants be N,,, and all other
factors thai influence transportation costs be T^. There is free entry, and Nn, is determined such that
economic profits are zero. Also, we assume that the fixed cost associated with operating a restaurant
varies across markets, but not within niarkeis. Lei this fixed cost in markel m be C ,
Contitiuing to fbiiow Salop (1979), ue hypothesize that N,,, is decreasing in C^ but increasing in
D,,, and T,,,. Thus, our model of N,,, is
N,,,=NiC.,,.D,,,,t,,). (1)
Similarly, we allow for the possibility that prices in a market depend on the marginal costs of firms in
that market ^MC„,) as well as N,,, and T,,,. The price of a meal in market m. P„„ is then
P^=P{MC,,..t,.N,,,). (2)
where Equations 1 and 2 represent a system of simultaneous (triangular) equations.
Finally, if one desires, we note thai Equation I can be substituted into Equation 2 to obtain
a reduced form equation for fast-food price,
P,,,=P{MC,,,.T~,X^.D,,X (3)
where N,,, no longer appears as a separate regressor. This equation approximates the reduced form
model used in Graddy (1997).''
3. Data and Kmpirical Model
We next document our data sourees and develop an empirical representation of the equations in
the previous section. We collected data t)n the prices and locations of McDonald's, Burger King, and
Wendy's restaurants in the District of Columbia and its surrounding suburbs.^ We identified stores
'' Following the notation in this study, the dependent variable inthe model of Graddy (1997) is the price of food at resiaurant > in
zip code ni A notable differcnee between this specification and thai of Salop(l979i is thai (he mtxiel of Graddy (1997) treats
individtial stores as the level of analysis, not tbe markei. Explanalory variables in the model of Clriiddy (1997) include a lew
store-specilk controls, such as (be number of employees, as well as many /.ip code-level proxies for costs, the competitive
environment, and ibe demographic characioristits of a /.ip code's residents, such as their race and income level.
The.se suburhs include Montjiomcij- and Prince George's counties in Maryland as well as Fairfax County, Arlington County,
and Alexandria City in Virginia.
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using local telephone directories, web-based lelephone directories, and company websites.^ Tn total, we
identified 32K restaurants and collected price infomiation on 253 of them during the late summer and
fall of 2002.'' At each of these stores, we recorded the price of a number one value meal, which includes
a hamburger sandwich, a soda, and fries. Among McDonald's and Burger King restaurants, value
meals were sold in medium, large, and extra-large sizes. We priced the large size. However, among
Wendy's restaurants, value meals were sold in only two sizes, a regular size and Biggie. We priced the
regular size. Finally, we supplemented our price and location data with information on the economic
and demographic characteristics of the zip codes in which restaurants are located. Some of these data
were taken from Census 2000, including the number of people living in the zip code, the racial and
ethnic characteristics of residents, the median household income, the average age of residents, and the
proportion of households containing children. Other data were taken from Realtor.com, a website with
real-estate listings, including the median value of homes in a zip code. Finally, we obtained data on the
size of each zip code in square miles from the ArcView software package. Complete data could be
collected for 97 zip codes in which we also had located restaurants.'"
As an initial step, we demonstrate that there exists a dispersion of prices and accessibility in the
region under study. Table 1 shows that the mean number of restaurants belonging to one of the three
chains was 3.08, with a standard deviation of 1.68 among the 97 zip codes used in our analysis. As for
price dispersion. Figure I further shows the distribution of prices at McDonald's and Burger King
establishments in our sample. Sampled restaurants affiliated with McDonald's were frequently
charging $4.09 or $4.19 for a large, number one value meal. At the same time, other stores were
selling this same meal for as little as $3,89 and as much as $4.56. Similarly, restaurants affiliated with
Burger King were frequently found to be charging $4.79 for their large, number one value meal.
However, we also observed prices as low as $4.29 and as high as S5,09, By contrast, among
restaurants affiliated with the Wendy's chain, all sampled establishments were charging $3.99 for
a regular, number one meal.''
Following Graddy (1997) and Lafontaine (1995), we next assume that separate zip codes arc
separate markets.'' For each market, we calculate the average price (without tax) of a meal, P„,, as
Each of ihe thret- fust fotid chalti,s under study has a i-e,staurant locator on their website.
We t;ollected prices by visiiing restaurants and by phoning restaurants. Among restaurants confacted by telephone, unusual
priL-e mfomiation was i.-tin tinned by rephoning or visiting ihe est;*bli,shmeni, Colictling accurate price data by ieiephone can be
problematic. Graddy (1997) used data collected by Card and Krueger (1994) and itote,s how oiher researchers have found
problems with these data. She cites one researcher, Lavin (1995), who comments that restaurant employees do not appear to
have always given accurate price data. For instance, some employee,s at Burger King restaurants may have reponed the price
for a Whopper when asked lor the price of a regular hamburger. We formulated our sampling strategy to minimi^x; this
problem. However, because of lime constraints, we ultimately could not obt;iiri reliable price data on all e,stablishments.
For some markets in wbich we had idemitied resiauranis. we couid not obtain pertinent dala about the zip axJe. such as the
cost of a home. ITiea- were ,1(K) restaurants in ihe 97 zip codes for which we had complete dala. Our price dala covered 240
of these MX) outlets.
This result might surprise some readers who would expect to pay the same price at iwo restaurants affiliated with Ihe same
chain. However, it is iniporlain to consider that itiost fast-food restaurants are owned and operated by Iranehisees. Moreover,
resale price maintenance is illegal in the United States. In odier words, large restaurant companies have direct control over
prices at only compatiy-owned outlets. Franchisees are free to set their own prices. While Lafontaine (1995) finds that prices
vary even across company-owned siores. price dispersion is greatesi atnong establishments owned hy franchisees.
The use of zip cixles lo proxy for markets is admittedly imperfect. Instead of assuming a 7,ip code to approximate a market,
Thomadsen (200,?) Ireats the size of a market as endogenous. Thai model facilitates his analysis of price competition among
restaurants. However, the mode! of Thomadsen i2()0_l) focuses on the second stage of a location-price game. In other words,
he analyze,s Ihe prices charged hy tinns, given that they have entered the market. He does not consider how access to fast food
can vaiy wiih the demographic characteristics of a market's residents, sueh as iheir income level, or the determinants of fixed
costs in a market, .such a.s the cost of housing.
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Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Definitions of Variables
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Definition
Endogenous
P
N
Fixed costs
HOUSE
4.2216
.3.0825
2.5273
Demand conditions
POP
INCOME
AGE
KIDS
2.7854
6.5029
.35.4718
0.2838
0.1741
1.6812
(.5164
1.35.30
2.2998
3.8933
0.1025
Other t ran sport al ion costs
RURAL 0.1237 0.3310
CITY 0.1237 (1.3310
SUBURBAN 0.7526 0.4338
Marginal costs
MNT
PG
VA
DC
WNDY
BK
MCD
0.2474
0.2371
0.3402
0.1753
0.1359
0.1336
0.7305
Race and ethnicity
HISPANIC
BLACK
0.1045
0.2993
0.4338
0.4276
0.4762
0.3822
0.1951
0.2439
0.2843
0.0837
0.2944
Average price of a meal among sampled establishments
Number of restaurants belonging lo one of three chains
under study
Median price of home ($100,000)
Number of residents (10,000 people)
Median household income ($10,000)
Median age of residents
Proportion of households with ilve-at-home children
Equals 1 if outside Beltway and residents per square mile
< 1500, 0 otherwise
Equals 1 if within Beltway and residents per square mile
> 9000, 0 otherwise
Omitted reference
Equals 1 if Montgomery County. Maryland, 0 otherwise
Equals 1 if Prince George's County, Maryland, 0 otherwise
Equals 1 if Virginia, 0 otherwise
Omitted reference
Proportion of restaurants belonging to Wendy's in calculation
of P
Proportion of restaurants belonging to Burger King in calculation
of/*
Omitted variable
Proportion of residents considering themselves to be Hispanic
Proportion of residents considering themselves to be black
well as the number of restaurants affiliated wiih any of the three restaurant chains, Nn,. The.se two
variables serve as the dependent variables in our analysis.
Among the explanatory variables in the empirical specification of our model, we proxy for fixed
costs, C„,, in Equation 1 with the median price of a house, measured in hundreds of thousands of
As mentioned earlier, we amid not obtain price d^ta on all n;staurants in all zip cixles. In ihcsc cases, P^ is the average price
of a meal at rcsiaurants from which prices were obtained. However, /V,,, remains ihc ntimber of reslauranis in tlic iip code,
regardless of wbether price data were obtained on eacb establisbmenl.
' As noted in fooinote fi. unlike Oraddy (19971. we aggregate our data to the zip-fode level. We tecl that this approach better
reflects the model of Salop (1979). which is of a market, not of a lirm. Moreover, as discussed below, our independent
variables incltide the income level of a market's residents, the number of people living in a markel, and other characteristics of
Ihe market in which a re.staurani is lotaied. It follows (bai. if we had modeled ihe prices charged by individual stores, there
would hyve been almost no variatiiiti in ihe value of the independent variables assticiated wiih different siores in the .same zip
cixle. Only if two stores in the same zip code belong to different chains could there have been sume variation in the value of an
indicator variable for store affiliation. Moulton (I9S61 has shown that estimation, using a cross-sectioti of daia in which many
ohscrvations share the same (or similar* values for iheir inttepenJent variables, can lead to an underestimation of the standard
error on Ibe coefficients. Aggregating our data to the zip-code level further removes tbis possibility.
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McDonald's
T; 3 60
3.85 4.45 More
Most Frequently Observed Price(s): $4.09, $4.19
Most Frequently Observed Price(s): $4.79
Figure I. The Observed Dispersion of Fast Food Prices. All prices are pre-litx sales prices. Inlerval midpoints are
provided below each bar while the height of a bar indicates the number of retailers charging a price within the inlerval.
For example, ihe first bar in the top figure corresponding to McDonald's indicates that a dozen of these restauranis were
charging ai least S3.80 but less than $3.90 (a midpoint of $3.85). The height of the second bar likewise illustrates that
twenty McDonald's restaurants were charging at least S3.90 but less ihan S4.00. However. a.s shown by (he height of the
third and fourth bars, we most trequcnily observed prices between S4,()0 and $4.19. Notably, a majority of all prices were
observed ai the upper-end of their depicted price interval. In other words, more prices ended in a nine, such as $3.99, than
in any other number like one ($3.91) or iwo ($3.92)
dollars, HOUSE. We hypothesize that the tiutnber of restaurants in a market is decreasing in fixed
costs, and therefore, so is HOUSE.^^ We also include several variables in Equation I to account for
aggregate demand, D,,,. Detnand is thought to depend on the number of consumers in the market and
so we include the zip code population in tens of thousands of people. POP. Following McCracken and
Brandt (1987), Byrne, Capps, and Saha (1998). and Stewart et al. (2004). we also include variables
shown to influence per capita spending on fast food. These include the median income of residents
measured in tens of thousands of dollars {INCOME), the median age of residents {AGE), and the
proportion of households with a child (KIDS).
In the estimation of tlie model, we also experimenied wiih stparatt- dummy variables for whether a restaurant was located in
the District of Columbia. Montgomery County, Prince George's (.'oimty. Fairfax County, Arlington County, or Alexandria
City. The reason is ihat insurance rates tend lo vary by couniy and past researchers have asked whether these rates impact tixed
costs. However, in our sludy. these vjuiablcs were never significant nor did they inliuence the sign and significance of other
variables in the model.
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We also use several variables to proxy for factors other than N,,, thought to affect the cost of
transportation in a market, l),,.^^ In particular, it i.s hypothesized that residents of rural, suburban, and
urban areas may have different costs for transportation. Some rural areas are geographically larger
than urban ones. Holding all else constant, it follows that residents of rural areas may tend to travel
farther distances than their urban counterparts. However, residents of urban areas may be less likely
to own a car and, if they do drive, have more difficulty parking or face more congested roads. Thus,
we created dummy variables to proxy for the three types of community. RURAL = 1 for markets
outside the Beltway with fewer than 1500 residents per square mile, and RURAL = 0 for all other zip
codes.'^ CITY is coded similarly except that it identifies inner-city markets with more than 9000
residents per square mile inside the Beltway. Including these two variables in the model, we contrast
areas classified as RURAL and CITY with more suburban communities, SUBURBAN, the reference
market.
In the empirical specification of Equation 2, we include A^ ,^, RURAL, and CITY to control for
other transportation co.sts, T,,,. and variables accounting for differences in marginal costs, MC,,,.
Variables controlling for marginal costs include three binary indicators of the county In which a zip
code is located. These are MNT= I if the market (zip code) is in Montgomery County, Maryland, and
0 otherwise; VA=\ if the market is anywhere in Virginia, and 0 otherwise; PG = 1 if the market is in
Prince George's County. Maryland, and 0 otherwise.'** Markets in the District of Columbia. DC. serve
as the reference market. Marginal costs can he expected to vary by county because the counties have
different sales tax rates and, very likely, different wage rates.
We also allow marginal costs to vary across chains. The marginal cost at McDonald's may differ
from that at Burger King, for example. If so, because we aggregate our data to the zip-code level, it
follows that the average level of marginal costs in a zip code will depend on the portion of all
restaurants belonging to each chain. Thus, we include in MC,,, the proportion of restaurants used in the
calculation of P^ belonging to McDonald's (MCD), Burger King (BK), and Wendy's (WNDY).
We assume a linear relationship between variables, and substituting the relevant variables Into
Equations 1 and 2 yields the following set of triangular equations:
N = 0k) + i\ClTY + I2RURAL + :t^HOUSE + ^INCOME + ^i^KlDS 4- ^(,AGE + i^PQP. (4)
P = Pn + 3,M/Vr + ^.VA + pi/'G + ^^WNDY + ^^BK + ^^CITY + ^^RURAL + ^^N. (5)
Appending Equations 4 and 5 with stochastic error terms creates the equations that are the basis
for our econometric analysis. If these error terms have zero covariance. then perfonning ordinary
least squares (OLS) on each equation separately will provide consistent estimates of the parameters
{0(o — 0(7, po — PM). However, the estimated parameters in Equation 5 will be inconsistent otherwise
(e.g., Lahiri and Schmidt 1978). Hausman (1978) demonstrates that his test for misspecification is
appropriate to test for zero covariance between the error terms. For this study, we performed the
version of the Hausman test proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). We used POP. HOUSE,
INCOME, AGE, and KIDS as instruments for N. We assume these instruments to be related to N. but
We tried including the proportion of residents without a car. It was highly collinear with/WCCM£ as well as with the variables
RURAL and CITY, discussed in this paragraph.
The Beltway is a highway encircling ihe District of Columbia and its inner suhurbs.
In place of l-'^. we also tried using separate indicator variables for Fairfax County. ,A.rlingion County, and Alexandria City,
These places are ail in Virginia, However, with ihe exception of Faidax County, they are also relaliveiy small in geographic
teniis. Likewise, we had few observations for Arlington County ;md .Alexandria City, which tnay help lo explain wby
these variables were never individually statistically significant. For example, our data include only three zip codes in
Arlington Counly.
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Table 2. Unconditional Correlation Matrix, Selected Independent Variables
RURAL
CITY
POP
INCOME
KIDS
AGE
HOUSE
BLACK
HISPANIC
RVR.XL
l.(XKH)
0,1412
-0.2S31
0.1320
0..3671
-0 .0 l.M
-0.1052
0.0946
-0.2489
r/7Y
1.0000
0.0393
-0.4044
-0.3938
-0.1824
-0.0636
0.1683
0.2522
POP
1 .(HKH)
-0.0129
0.1825
0.0154
-0.0154
0.2523
0.0333
tNCOML
1 .(HKX)
0.4651
0.6553
0.6961
- 0 . 5 5 0 3
- 0 . 2 5 4 8
KIDS
1.0000
0.1174
-0.0105
0.0319
-0.2020
AGE
1.0000
0.5596
-0.2344
-0.2221
HOUSE
1.0000
-0.4776
-0.1386
BIACK HISPANIC
I,O(K)O
-0.3066 1.0000
any linear combination of them to be exogenous to P. We failed to reject the null hypothesis that OLS
provides consistent estimates of the parameters in Equation 5. The coefticient on the hrsi stage
residtjals was 0.0036. with a standard erTor of 0.0137 ( / ' value = 0,7917).
Estimating the triangular system of Equations 4 and 5 using a seemingly unrelated regressions
(SUR) procedure is an unrestricted approach compared with estimating each equation separately by
OLS. Moreover, it has been shown that, even if N were endogenous in the equation for P. iterated
SUR will provide consistent and efficient parameter estimates, ignoring the simultaneity (Greene
1997, p. 736-7). This result is attributed to Lahiri and Schmidt (1978). Thus, we estimated Equations
4 and 5 using an iterated SUR procedure.'*^
A second consideration wa.s the potential for collinearity among explanatory variables. Graddy
(1997) encountered this problem and concedes that it may have affected some of her estimation
results. Indeed, in this study, there is also a significant correlation among many of the proxies for costs
and demand conditions. A correlation matrix is provided in Table 2. Among variables sharing
a potentially troublesome correlation, for example, are INCOME and HOUSE. Housing prices tend to
be greater in markets with higher income households.
Because muUicollinearity between explanatory variables can affect estimation results (Greene
1997). we report results from entering transportation cost, marginal cost, fixed cost, and demand
variables sequentially in Table 3. The tirst pair of columns contains estimation results when only
transportation costs are included in the model. The second pair of columns provides the estimated
coefficients and their standard errors when variables controlling for tnarginal costs are added to those
for transportation costs. By contrast, the third, founh. and fifth pairs of columns contain all variables in
the structural model except proxies for demand conditions, fixed costs, and marginal costs,
respectively. Estimation results for [he full empirical model (specificalion 6). which most closely
approximates the structural model of Salop (1979). are contained in the sixth pair of columns in Table 3.
Finally, we supplement the model in specification 6 with BLACK and HISPANIC, which
measure the proportion of households considering themselves to belong to each group, and are
derived from Census 2000.""' While not strictly suggested by Salop's ihcorctical model, we include
'" Ti) be sure, estimatit«i by Ot-S, iieratcd SUR. and even lwo-si;ige least squares (TSLSt yicliied similar results. OLS and TSLS
results arc available froni Ihc authors on request.
'" Ii I'luild bc urguod ihiit these rucial anil elhnic variables htlong anmny iho proxies Ibr demand iimdiiiuiis. tlowever,
McCracken and Brantll (1^X71. Bymc. Capps, and Saha (I WXi. and Sti-wan ci al. (2(HM) dn nul lind a statistically signilicani
relationship between being black ami a houv-'hold s spemiing for fast fiHxl. However. Bymc. Capps. and Saha (1998) and
Stewart ei ai. 12004) lind that Hispanic households may have a sJightty elevated demand Tor fasi food.
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Table 4. Estimated Coefficients and Standard Errors.^ Including Race and Ethnicity
Intercept
MNT
VA
PG
WNDY
BK
cm
RURAL
N
HOUSE
POP
INCOME
KIDS
AGE
BLACK
HISPANIC
* Slmdud errors arc in parenthe,ses.
* Significani at 5''^ level.
•• Signilicani at im level.
8.1717*
(1.6919)
-0.1472
(0.5235)
0.4879
(0.5303)
-0.3304*
(0.1635)
0.6429*
(0.1270)
0.2839
(0.1805)
-0.0609*
(0.0230)
-0.1652*
(0.0555)
0.0003
(O.OOSS)
-0.0227
(0.0231)
0.340
4.2217*
(0.0394)
0.0473
(0.0393)
-0.0251
(0.0376)
0.0711**
(0.0399)
-0.1873*
(0.0585)
0.4779*
(0.0433)
0.1312*
(0.0393)
-0.0621**
(0.0335)
-0.0159*
(0.0063)
-0.0006
(0.0005)
0.0001
0.710
them in our empirical model tor the sake of comparison with past studies and to determine whether
prices might be higher or lower in communities with a greater proportion of minorities. These
estimation results are presented in Ihe Table 4.
4. Findings
The data appear to fit the model well. As shown in ihc (irst five pairs of columns in Table 3,
coefficients on explanatory variables change little in sign or magnitude across specifications. Note that
INCOME is not statistically significant when HOUSE is not included (specification 4). Because the
variables INCOME and HOUSE arc positively correlated, bul their coefficients have opposing signs in
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theory, it is likely that without HOUSE. INCOME is biased toward zero. For the empirical
specitication that most closely approximates Salop's theory, as shown iti the linal pair of columns in
Table 3, the value of R' in the equation for N is 0.338 and that in the equation for P is 0.708.'' We
now examine the results for this specification and then consider the impact of supplementing the
empirical specification of our structural model with racial and ethnic variables.
Among our estimation results for Equation 4, we tind that the number of restaurants in
a market is decreasing in fixed costs, as the coefficient on HOUSE is negative and significant at
the 5% level. In particular, we find that an increase in the median price of a home of $100,(K}0 will
cause a market to have about 0.33 fewer restaurants. Theoretically, if fixed costs rise and demand
is held constant, there is a decrease in the number of restaurants that can make a normal economic
profit in a market.
There is also empirical evidence that the number of restaurants is increasing in the aggregate
demand for fast food. For example, the coeflicient on POP is positive and significani at ihe 5% level.
An increase in population size of 10,000 people will cause the number of fast-food restaurants in
a market to rise by about 0.7 establishments. INCOME is also statistically significant at the 10%
level, if we control for HOUSE. In general, if demand rises and fixed costs are held constant, there is
an increase in the number of restaurants that can make a normal economic profit in a market. To be
sure, this result is best interpreted as a short-run effect. It is unlikely that, in the long run, real-estate
prices would remain constant following an increase in a market's population or in the income of
its residents.
The results may be better understood with a simple example. Consider the number of
restaurants in zip code 20837, Poolesville. and in zip code 20705, Beltsville. Both communities
are relatively large when measured in total area. Poolesville occupies 43.29 square miles of
Maryland, while Beltsville accounts for 19.23 square miles. However, a retailer's fixed costs are
likely to be higher in Pooiesville. The median value of a home is about $265,000 in Poolesville as
compared with about $146,000 in Beltsville. Demand may also be greater in Beltsville, where
about 23.000 people live. The total population of Poolesville is Just 6000. The implication is that,
although Beltsville is smaller in area, its lower fixed costs and higher aggregate demand support
five of the selected fast-food estabhshments, while market characteristics in Poolesville support
only one.
Our estimation results for Equation 5 (specification 6. column P) suggest that the average price
of fast food is decreasing in the number of restautants. The coefficient on N,,, is negative and
statistically significant at the 5% level. The entry of a finn into a market brings down the average price
of a meal by about $0,02. However, arguably, this change in price is small relative to the total price of
a meal. On this matter, our study appears to agree with Graddy (1997), who finds that restaurants in
markets with three or fewer fast-food outlets charge about 2,4% more than stores in zip codes with
four or more outlets.
It further follows from the statistical significance of the coefficient on A',,, in Equation 5 that
a relationship exists between prices and spatial differences in costs and demand conditions. We can
calculate the marginal effect of a variable in Equation 4 on the price. Eirst consider the marginal effect
Ciilfulatcd for each equation using tliL' cstimiited SUR coefficienls. As shown in Table 3, Ihe resulting values of R' do not
necessarily decrea.se for both equations, if a variable is remiwedlrom ihc model. Tbiscouiiterintuiiive result LIUI occur because
we are minimizing the generalized sum of squares and is among ihe many short comings associated with measures uf R'
in generalized linear models le.g., Greene 1997).
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of HOUSE. Theory predicts that increases in fixed costs should drive firms out of a market and prices
may go up. In fact, we find thai
OP ON
— = (-0,0190)(-0.3315) ^0.0063.
ON OHOUSE ^ ' '
A $100.(XX) increa.se in the median price of a home implies an increase of almost $0.01 in the average
price of a meal. Furthermore, using the means presented in Table I, it is possible to calculate the
elasticity of price with respect to the median cost of housing. Doing so. we find that a 10% increase iti
median housing prices causes a 0.04'>f increa.se in fasl-food prices. Similarly, it could be asked
wheiher prices are relatively higher in lower income neighborhoods. Thai is, the marginal effeci of
INCOME is
dP ON
= {-0.0I9O)(O.2788) - -0.0053.
ON OINCOME ' " '
In words, a $10,000 increase in the median income of a market's residents will cause the average price
of a fast-food meal lo decrease by less than SO.OI. As measured in tenns of an elasticity, a 10%
increase in the median income of households is associated with a 0.08% decrease in fast-food prices.
Our results further appear lo agree with Graddy (1997) on the marginal effects oi' INCOME and
HOUSE. Graddy (1997) also finds that prices are increasing with the cost o( housing and, controlling
for housing costs, decreasing in ihe median income of residents. For instance, in some speciticalions
of her model. Graddy (1997) finds that a 10% increase in ihe median income of a zip code's residents
is associated with a 1.57% decrease in the price of a fast-food meal.
On the subject of the racial and ethnic composition of markets, our study does not agree with the
results of Graddy (1997). As shown in Table 4. when racial and ethnic variables are added to our
model, controlling for costs and demand conditions, we find no evidence that prices are higher or
access is more limited in neighborhoods with a greater proportion of minority residents. The
coefficients on BLACK and HISPANIC are not statistically significant. There are several possible
explanations for why the two studies differ on this result. Arguably, because both analyses are case
studies of two different urban areas, each could be a regional phenomenon. For example, there could
be differences in how racial and ethnic variables happen lo be correlated with proxies for costs or
demand conditions, which we have found to influence the number of firms in a market.~"
While many of our results agree with those of Graddy (1997). we believe it is interesting to
compare ihe results of estimating our empirical specification of Equations I and 2 simultaneously with
results of estimating an empirical specification for our reduced form Equation 3, when the racial and
ethnic variables, BLACK and HISPANIC, are again included in the model. As shown in Table 5, the
direction of the marginal effects on key variables does not change. However, we find that fewer of the
variables are statisiically significant. For instance, the estimated coefficient on HOUSE is positive
white the coefficients on INCOME and POP are negative. However, only HOUSE and POP are
significani at the 5 or 10% levels, while INCOME becomes insignificant. Arguably, the greater
shortcoming associated with estimating a reduced form model is that this approach provides no
insights into why fasl-food prices are lower in communities with less expensive housing or greater
population levels. In contrast, our structural equations clearly show the mechanism at work.
" [n facl. Graddy (1997) cwicedes thai ihe inclusion of racial variables jn her mcidel aftccts the significance of some proxies
for costs.
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Table S. Estimated Coefficients and Standard Errors,^ Reduced Form
Intercept
MNT
VA
PG
WNDY
BK
RURAL
CITY
HOUSE
PQP
INCOME
KIDS
AGE
BLACK
HISPANIC
4.2657
(0.1323)*
0.0888
(0.0505)**
0.0027
(0.0505)
0.0844
(0.0529)
-0.1987
(0.0612)*
0.4473
(0.0449)*
-0.0676
(0.0397)**
0.1172
(0.0411)*
0,0261
(0.0126)*
-0.0168
(0.0096)**
-0.{H)84
(0.0147)
0.0562
(0.1704)
-0.0031
(0.0045)
-3.87 X K)
(0.0008)
0.0004
(0,0018)
0.719
" Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at We level,
** Significant at ]()% level.
5. Conclusions
We utilize a unique set of data to estimate a model of accessibility and pricing among fast-food
restaurants in metropolitan Washington, DC. We find that the sociodemographic profile of
a cotiimunity influences the number, and therefore the accessibility, of fast-food restaurants in Ihat
market, and prices may move slightly through spatial differences in access. We also compare our
results on price dispersion with the findings of a past .study. In general, we find quite a lot of
agreement between our study and the past analysis. One notable exception is Ihe effect of race and
ethnicity.
The model tested in this study allows for a much richer interpretation of the results than do
models tested in past analyses. As a Hnal illustrative exercise, we consider two hypothetical markets
and assume that consumers in both markets have the same aggregate demand for fast food, but tixed
costs are higher in one market than in the other. We denote these markets as the high-cost and
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low-cost markets, respectively. Next, assuming all else constant, we use the results of this study to
argue that N is decreasing in C. that is, /Vh,^ i,-a.M *^  ^um-o>si- 'l follows that individual tirms in the
high-cost market are likely serving more meals than individual tirms in the low-cost market. Recall
our assumption that firms incur a constant marginal cost of production. Based on this assumption, it
follows that the average cost of production will decline with output. As such, it is possible that firms in
the high-cost market have aboul the same average cost as firms in the low-cost market. The former
spread these fixed costs over more meals. Finally, because price equals average cost is an equilibrium
condition, it follows that prices need not vary much with fixed costs. It would be sufficient that the
number of firms varies, thereby explaining the findings of this study and other researchers of little
variation in average prices with proxies for costs and demand.
However, even if the impact is small, we do find that average prices vary with hxed costs and
demand. Continuing with our above example, we know that consumers in the high-cost market will
have less access, continuing to hold all other factors constant. In tum, restaur;uits in the community
have fewer competitors and. ihus. more market power. To be sure, we again note that the extent of this
latter impact appears to be small. Prices move slightly with differences in accessibility.
This study ha.s examined accessibility and pricing for fast food because the authors believe that
such an analysis may be more easily undertiikcn than studies of grocery prices. However, it follows
that the results of this study cannot be t^ eadily extended to explaining the conduct of supermaiicets or
even other types of restaurant, such as full-service ones. That would require controlling for differences
in store formats and differences in the qualities of goods .sold. Therefore, a goal of future analysis
might be to incorporate such factors into a structural model o( monopolistic competition, where results
are easily interpreted.
References
Bresnahan. Timothy F.. and Peter C. Rei.-.s. iy9l. Entry atid compelilion in concenlrated maikcia. Juurnal of Pi.iliiicul Economy
Byrne. Patrick J.. Oni! Capps Jr.. and Aianu Saha. IWS. Analysis of qtiick-sffve, mid-stale, and up-M:ate focxl away from home
cxpciidilures. The Intcriiiitiimat Food aiiil Aurihusintw.s Mana^vmcni Ri'vien' 1:51-72.
Cappo//a. tX-ntiis. and Robert Van Order. 1478. A generali/fd model of spatial compelition. The American Economic
Cappozza. Dennis, tind Robert Viin Order. lySd. Unique equilibria, pure profiis. and efficiency in location niiidch. Tlif Amcriniit
Economic ScvicH' 7(1:1(146-53.
Card. David, and Alan Knieger. 1994. Minimum wages and employmeni: A fa.se study of ihe fasi food industry in New Jersey
and Pennsylvania. The American Ecorumiic Reviev.- 84:772-93.
Davidsiin. Russell, and James MacKinnon. 199.1. F.slimation and in/fn-mr in econometrics. New York: Oxford University
Pa-ss.
Frjnkel. David M.. and F.ric D. Gould. 20()l. The retail pritc of inequality. .laiiirml of Urbun F.nmumics 49:219-39.
Grdddy. Kachfyn. 1997 t>o fasi food chains price discriminatt on the niic and income characieristies of an area? Journal of
Busme!.s and Eciuwmic Statistics I.^:.19I—401.
Greene. William tt. 1997. Econometric analysis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pn;nlice Hall.
Hausman. J. A. 1978. Specification tesis in econometrics. Eaniomeiricu 46:1251-71.
Hayes. Lashawn R. 2()(X1. Are prices higher for the poor in New York City'.' Journal of Consumer Policy 2.V 127-52.
Holelling. Harold. 1929, Stability in compelition. Economic Journal 39:41-57.
Jekanow\ki. Mark. IWH .An econometric analysis of tbe demand for fasi fixxl across meIropotitan areas with an emphasis on the
role of avaiiability. Ph.D. dissertation. Purdue tiniversity. Wesi t^fayelte. IN.
Kaufman. Phillip R.. James M. MacDonald. Sieven M. Lut/.. :md David M. .Smallwmxt. 1997. Do the piior pay more for food?
Item selection and price differences affect low-income household ftMid costs. Agricultural Economics Report No. 7.'i9.
Washington. DC: Economic Research Service. U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Lafontuine. Francine. 1995. Pricing decisions in Franchised chains: A Uwk at the fast-food industry. NBER Woricing Paper No.
5247.
Accessibility and Food Pricing 799
Lahiri. Kajal, and Peier Schmidt. 1978. On ihe csiimaiion nr triangular stniclunil systems, Econometrica 46:1217-21,
Lavin. Jamcs K, 1495, Evaluating the impact «l minimum wages on employmtni: Endogenoii-. demand shocks in the fast-food
indusirv-. Unpublished paper. Stanford L'niversity. Department of Economics,
MacDonald, James M,, and Paul E, Nelson, IWI, Do tbe poor still pay more',' FOIKI price vatiaiions in large metropolitan areas.
Journal of Urban Economics 30:.144-59,
MacLeod. W, B.. G. Norman, and J.-F, Thisse, 198S, Price dischminaiion and eqiiilibntjm in monop<}listit competition,
Internalhnal Journal of Indusirial Orsanizaiion 6:429-46.
McCracken. Vicki A., and Jon A, Brandt, 1987. Household consumption of food away from home: Toial expenditure and by
[ype ol' f(Hxl facility, Ameritan Journal i>{Auriciiltural htimoniu.s 69:274-84,
Moulton. Brent k, l9Rfi. Random group el'l'ecls and the precision of rega'xsion estimates. Journal of Econometrics 32:385-97.
Puu. Tonu, 2(K)2, Hotelling's "ice cream dealers" wiih elastic demand. The Annals of Regional Science 36:1-17.
Rath. Kali P,. and Gongyun Zhao, 2001. Two stage eiiuilibrium and product choice with elastic demand./n(€rnarwnti/7ourn(i/<;/
Industrial Organization 19:1441-55,
Salop. Steven C, 1979, Monopolistic competition with outside gotxis. The Bell Journal of Economics 10:141-56,
Stewart. Hayden. Noel Blisard. Sanjib Bhuyan. and Rodoifo Naygu, 2004. The demand for food away from home: Full-service
or fast food? Agricultural Economies Report No, S29. Washington. DC: Economic Reseaa'h Service. U,S. IJepadment of
Agriculture,
Thomaiisen. Raphael. 2003. The eftects of ownership structure on prices in geographically differentiated industries. Unpublished
paper. Columbia Business School,

